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The American Express Case: Public Good or Monopoly?
Abstract
On February 20, 1974 a civil complaint for declarative and injunctlve relief was filed by Consumers Union and
one Linda Blitz against the American Express Company and the U.S. Shoe Retail Corporation under section 1
of the Sherman Act.^ American Express and U.S. Shoe Retail were charged with being in restraint of trade.
Specifically the companies were charged with being parties to a "restrictive contract", which "eliminates price
competition in the sale of goods and services to cash customers and credit card customers...", and with
imposing a tie in sale. Both activities are viewed in the law as being in restraint of trade. The provision of the
contract to which objection was made read as follows:
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The Issue
On February 20, 1974 a civil coiqplaint for declarative and injunc-
tlve relief was filed by Consumers Union and one Linda Blitz against the
American Express Company and the U.S. Shoe Retail Corporation under
section 1 of the Sherman Act.^ American Express and U.S. Shoe Retail
were charged with being in restraint of trade. Specifically the com
panies were charged with being parties to a "restrictive contract",
which "eliminates price competition in the sale of goods and services to
cash customers and credit card customers...", and with imposing a tie in
sale. Both activities are viewed in the law as being in restraint of
trade. The provision of the contract to which objection was made read
as follows:
You [the seller] agree that the prices (including any
service or other charges) charged to our Cardmembers including
advertised sales will not be greater than those charged to
other customers.
In effect this provision forbade the granting of discounts to those
customers offering to pay in cash. Retailers accepting the American
Express Card as means of payment generally pay a percentage of the sales
2
price ranging from 4 1/2% to 6% of the sale price.
Consumers Union apparently believes that prices posted by retailers
who accept credit cards as a means of payment are higher than would
All references to the content of the suit are to the complaint as
filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (plus
appended Retail Store Agreement), and as supplied by Mr. Paul Gewirtz,
attorney for the plaintiffs. The cooperation of Mr, Gewirtz and the
Center for Law and Social Policy in supplying requested information is
hereby gratefully acknowledged.
2
There is an additional charge of $25 "endorsement fee" per year
for establishments generating less than $1000 in American Express credit
card sales, the significance of which will be examined below.
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otherwise be the case. Consumers Union wants retailers to be permitte^d
to reduce the prices paid by consumers not using credit cards (specif
ically, the American Express card in the case under review). Presumably,
Consumers Union believes that, given the opportunity, many retailers
would in fact so reduce their prices to cash-paying customers because of
. . 4
competitive pressures.
The suit against American Express was intended to set a precedent,
and, eventually to lead to lower prices at the retail level to cash-
paying customers. In fact, the American Express Company has agreed, in
an out-of-court settlement, to permit retail stores that accept its
credit card to grant discounts to customers who pay cash, and so to
inform all retail establishments accepting the American Express card,^
Agreements with other credit card companies have followed upon the
American Express settlement. One could reasonably infer, then, that the
set! lement between Consumers Union and American Express has served as a
precedent. The suit, previously pending against American Express, has
3
As a fine legal point, one should refer to "the plaintiffs", but
in this paper "Consumers Union" will be used at times when the former is
what is, meant.
4
A lawyer for Consumers Union argued this very point. Cf. The Wall
Street Journal, XC (April 18, 1974).
It should perhaps be noted here that the Consumers Union is a non
profit organization that articulates what it believes to be the interests
of the consumer. Among other things, the organization publishes a maga
zine (Consumers Union Reports). in which results of product testing of
interest to consumers are presented.
That prices to cash paying customers are alleged to be higher than
they would be, in the absence of the aforementioned contractual agreement
between American Express and its retailers, can be seen from the follow
ing allegation contained in the original suit: "Plaintiffs Blitz and
Consumers Union and its members have suffered and will continue to suffer
irreparable injury from the practices described in...this Complaint".
Cf, the article cited in footnote 4, above.
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been withdrawn by the plaintiffs as part of the settlement.
The out-of-court settlement should be of interest to the economist
both as theorist and as policy adviser. Important theoretical issues are
raised by this case. These Issues include the applicability of the
monopoly model to cases of less than perfect information; and the ability
of the nuarket to supply public goods profitably. Further, the suit
against American Express has already served as a precedent in other cases,
and may continue to serve as a precedent.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the issues raised by the
Consumers Union suit against the American Express Company and the subse
quent out-of-court settlement. The important theoretical issues raised
by the suit will be examined. Specifically, the question of the effects
of credit card usage on pricing will be analyzed in detail. In the
course of doing so, it will be argued that an important motive for using
credit cards has generally been overlooked, and that this causal factor
at least mitigates the effects of credit card use on prices.
Whose Monopoly?
The ability of a firm to sell at a price above the competitive
level tor above marginal cost at the current output rate] is usually
taken as evidence of the existence of monopoly power at some stage
in the production process. The economist is naturally interested in
the source of the monopoly power. Few would argue that the retailers
are the source of the monopoly power in the Armerican Express case.^ Most
Consumers Union apparently believes that the retailers do not
possess monopoly power themselves. In their suit they assert: "But for
the restrictive contract, sellers, including U.S. Shoe Retail Corporation,
would be able to charge a different and lower price to cash customers
than they charge to American Express card customers". The suit also
speaks of the fact that: "Many of these sellers [the retailers] compete
with each other in the sale of goods and services".
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economlsts would agree that the thousands of retailers who accept credit
cards are pure competitors. Even if these retailers did possess monopoly
power, they would not need to make use of a credit card to exercise it.
The American Express Company must possess monopoly power, then, if
anyone does. But over what good do they possess a monopoly? The name
"American Express Card" is a registered trademark, of course. No other
individual or entity may make use of the trademark. The American Express
Company has then, in a trivial sense, a monopoly over the American Express
card because of the laws respecting the use of brand names.
The existence of a brand name is surely not, Ipso facto, sufficient
to demonstrate the existence of monopoly power. Brand name is a method
of assuring quality. With no brand names, the unsatisfied consumer would
not know to whom to complain about a faulty product. In a world with no
brand names, a consumer would neither know who had produced goods, nor
where he had bought them (the name of the retailer being a brand name of
sorts). Such a world is inconceivable, of course, because it is incon
ceivable that an economy could be organized without some identification
as to the source of the product (at minimum, the consumer can remember
where he purchased a good), Brand names can have more or less signifi
cance. The less assurance as to quality that a consumer receives from
brand names, the more he must engage in search activity on his own, and
supply Information as to quality himself. Brand names serve, in part at
least, to lower costs of search and inspection.
If the existence of search and inspection costs helps to explain the
economic service provided by brand names, then it must be acknowledged
that some brand nan^s may save the consumer more or less of these informa
tion costs than other brand names. The "same" physical good with one
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brand name may then sell for a different price. But a competitive
equilibrium of sorts can still result in that industry (recognizing the
inherent difficulty of defining an industry now) if the price of each
branded product equals the marginal cost (inclusive or establishing the
quality of the brand name). Thus it may or may not be true that one
credit card provides more brand name services than another. Indeed, it
is an implication of this paper that some credit cards provide more of
some kind of service than do others.^ But whether the American Express
card is perceived to be the "sfime" card as the Diners Club card, etc. is
not the point. For if American Express possesses monopoly power, it must
have a monopoly in the supplying of the means of payment, record of pay
ment, consolidated billing and other such services!
g
All credit card:, as well as cash and checks, are means of payment.
At best, and only in certain circumstances, a credit card is a perfect
substitute for cash at the margin. At best, then American Express is a
competitor with the Federal Reserve System and the nation's coiranercial
banks in supplying the media of exchange. Given the number of close sub
stitutes for the American Express card, it would seem unlikely that Ajseri-
can Express possesses significant monopoly power in the credit card
industry. It might be argued that there are only a few national credit
cards, and that we should, perhaps, treat this as an oligopolistic
industry. This would, of course, mean treating the media of exchange
"industry" as oligopolistic. More to the point, however, this taxonomy
would overlook the fact that virtually every retailer is capable of
^Cf. pp. 19-20 below.
g
Thus, monetary economists are used to treating credit cards as sub
stitutes for money, and their use as increasing velocity.
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providing the services provided by national credit cards himself, if not
with his own credit card, then with a running account for those customers
who would make use of this service. An investigation into the structure
of the credit card industry would not seem to be a fruitful approach then.
It would seem then that the contention that American Express pos
sesses any monopoly power that would enable it to engage in any illegal
price fixing is severely undercut.
The Information Problem
Why would retailers be willing to incur the costs of accepting a
credit card? This is the question that must be answered in analyzing
the economics of this suit. Economic theory tells us that producers
are cost-minimizers. Costs are willingly incurred as long as they
result in a revenue gain, which at least compensates the producer at the
margin. Retailers presumably willingly incur the costs involved in
accepting credit cards because they expect thereby to capture a revenue
gain that at least compensates them at the margin.
I believe that a reasonable hypothesis, which helps to explain why
a retailer enters into a credit card agreement,is that he is paying for
advertising. That a major part of the costs to a retailer incurred in
accepting a credit card as a means of payment is for advertising can be
most readily seen in the case of the so-called luxury credit cards:
American Express, Diners Club and Carte Blanche. Let us focus on the
American Express card. This will be done both for the sake of concrete-
ness in exposition, and because the suit in question was directed speci
fically against the American Express Co. As with Diners Club and Carte
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Blanche, American Express publishes a magazine for its cardholders*
Considerable space is devoted to "touting" establishments that accept
the credit card in question. Moreover, most of the space in these maga
zines is devoted to attempting to stimulate the cardholders* purchase of
those goods that are most likely to be paid for with a credit card:
9
travel, dining out, etc.
American Express takes out full page advertisements in various
national magazines, featuring and praising resorts, hotels and restau
rants that accept the American Express card. In part these advertisements
are seeking new cardholders. But they also appeal to current cardholders
to patronize these e. tablishments and to use their American Express card
to pay for the goods and services purchased at them. The ads appear in
magazines whose readers apparently possess an above-average Income, and
hence, a higher than average probability of being a cardholder, or being
a potential candidate for an American Express card. Several of the
credit card companies advertise jointly with airline companies to gen
erate air travel business.
All of these activities are calculated to generate an increased
demand for the products of companies that accept tfie credit card of the
company doing the advertising. Advertising is, of course, a classic
9
The American Express cardholder magazine is called Travel and
Leisure. In the April, 1974 issues, as an example, eight pages out of
74 were given over to plugging specific firms that accept the American
Express card.
Even the name Travel and Leisure is suggestive of the "message"
being given in the magazine.
^The author has seen joint advertisements by American Express and
several different airline companies (including United and Delta), as well
as advertisements by Carte Blanche and Delta. To cite another example,
Master Charge pays for billboard, magazine and television advertisements
suggesting the use of that credit card as a convenient means to pay for
transportation, hotel and restaurant services.
example of a public good; it is relatively costly to make those who
benefit from its production contribute a proportionate share of its pro
duction costs. Exclusion of non-payers is then relatively costly. Many
of the practices of credit card companies seem to be directed toward
circumventing the costs inherent in the private production of a public
good.
The percentage charge on sales is thus seen as a method by which the
credit card companies assess those who benefit most from the advertisements
12
and other services for which the credit card companies have paid. There
is at least some correlation between the use of a particular credit card
(e.g., an American Express card) by a customer and the source of the
information possessed by the customer about the existence of the estab
lishment in question. Ceteris paribus, the more of firm's sales that
are generated by the advertisements, the larger will be the fees paid to
13
the credit card conqsaiy.
On the theoretical problem of privately producing public goods, cf.
Harold Derasetz, "The Private Production of a Public Good", The Journal of
Law and Economics, XIII (October, 1970), 293-306.
12
It is of course true that tliere are costs of collection involved in
the use of credit cards, for which the credit card companies must charge
(i.e., there are transaction costs involved in the lessening of other
transaction costs). Nor is it being denied that the use of credit cards
may involve the lowering of certain costs involved in the payments process.
For example, individuals traveling to places where they are not already
known might find it otherwise necessary to carry large amounts of cash,
because of the costs incurred by retailers in cashing their checks in such
circumstances. The use of credit cards is a means of avoiding both the
carrying of large amounts of cash, which presumably is costly for the would-
be customer, and the cashing of checks drawn on individuals of dubious sta
ture. The existence of benefits of this kind are taken to be obvious. But
there exist a number of other mechanisms for circumventing this particular
payments difficulty: travelers checks and check-guarantee cards being two
of these mechanisms. The intent of this paper is to focus on a benefit of
credit cards to which little attention has been paid, and which, it is
argued, is of importance for the case at hand.
13But cf. the section below on the American Express fee structure
for its retailers.
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The credit card companies do not merely provide advertising services.
To some extent they certify the quality of goods being sold by an estab
lishment accepting the credit card in question. The very fact that an
establishment accepts a particular credit card supplies information to
the cardholder. The cardholder has a reasonable expectation that the
credit card cotrpany would not permit its name to be displayed by a
crooked business, or by a firm about which complaints are persistently
received from cardholders. Some of the credit card company's own brand
14
name is at stake in such a situation.
This certifying function is undoubtedly most important for the
traveler visiting a strange city. The luxury credit cards appear parti
cularly anxious to create the Impression that only quality restaurants,
hotels, etc. accept tlese credit cards. American Express, for Instance,
makes some attempt to supply additional information about places to eat
and sleep in various guides to different cities, made available to card
holders. A gourmet meal is not promised, nor, one suspects, expected;
15an acceptable meal is strongly suggested at listed restaurants.
The important point is that viewed in this manner the contract
between the credit card con^anies and the retailers is a solution to a
14
Indeed, a clause in the contract between American Express and its
retailers serves to raise the cost to a retailer of giving unsatisfactory
service to a cardholder; "If the Cardmember should refuse to make payment
in full because of any such claim or complaint, you will reimburse us for
the amount which the Cardmember refuses to pay or we may deduct this amount
from subsequent payment to you."
^^In the terminology adopted by Phillip Nelson, credit card companies
(in this case, American Express) seem particularly prone to advertise
"experience goods" (as opposed to "search goods"). Thus, the hypothesis
of this paper is at least consistent with Nelson's fascinating hypothesis.
Cf, Phillip Nelson, "Advertising as Information", Journal of Political
Economy. 82 (July/August, 1974), 729-54.
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genuine information problem. The consumer desires information about pro
ducts and is willing to pay for this information. The retailer is willing
to pay for low cost advertising to supply this information. The credit
card company is willing to supply the advertising in which the desired
Information is conveyed, to the mutual benefit of all.
For cash-paying customers, the retailer has had to produce desired
information himself. Thus, this hypothesis not only explains why retail
ers are willing to pay a fee to the credit card companies, but suggests
that discounts for cash may be less widespread than is presently supposed,
once the new decision has been fully adjusted to. There are not quanti
tatively different costs in obtaining cash-paying and credit card-paying
customers. The cost have merely been borne initially by different
parties.
The clause in question was an attempt to find a low cost way to
avoid what might be termed "cheating" by the retailers. Let us take
what is the prototypical case of this paper. An American Express card
holder discovers about the existence of an establishment because of an
advertisement supplied by the American Express Company. Thus, American
Express has incurred the cost of advertising for the retailer, in expec
tation of receiving payment via its taking a percentage of the retailer's
sales paid for with an American Express card. The individual retailer
has an incentive to offer a co-'-ert cash discount to an American Express
cardholder, who, ex hypothesis was attracted to that retailer by an
advertisement for which the retailer did not pay. Thus, while ^ general
it is not true that it is any cheaper to serve cash customers, in this
case it is, precisely because the public good--advertising--has been
produced already, and the retailer can "free ride" on its effects. One
- i] -
can assume the claust in the contract prevented this happening in very
many cases.But i: is not difficult to see what the long run effects
of this behavior on Lhe part of retailers would be, in the absence of an
alternative mechanism with which to supress such retailer cheating. In
Jthe long run (which would, I believe, be a comparatively short period of
time), American Express would be compelled to curtail its advertising of
particular retailers. Retailers would find that increasingly they would
have to provide their own advertising services. Only if a customer is a
cardholder (and then only to the extent it can be assumed he acquired
his information about the establishment from American Express or another
credit card company) is there a real saving to be effected by selling for
cash. And that saving will, as we have argued, prove illusory.Yet,
in the absence of a method of detecting and eliminating the kind of
cheating described here, it will be In the interest of the retailer--in
each individual case--to cheat, even though it is in the interest of
retailers as a group to prevent cheating, and thus keep the advertising
services of the American Express Company. This dilemma is the classic
one faced whenever there is an externality.
If American Express had not forbidden the granting of cash discounts,
then too many cardholders would have paid with cash in the absence of an
alternative mechanism for making the beneficiaries of the advertising pay
for the benefits received. Let us assume for a moment that no other
fnechanism is available. Then the credit card company would not, as we
Low cost enforcement of the contractual provision is assumed to
have been the case.
Again, this is the case where a retailer receives the benefit of an
American Express advertisement (in the form of a customer he would not
otherwise have) but avoids paying for it by negotiating a cash sale instead.
- 12 -
have seen, be compensated for performing its middleman function, and would
be compelled to curtail its advertising. In this case, a cut-back in
advertising services provided by American Express (and other credit card
companies, as they settle) would be a predictable result of the out-of-
court settlement. If, as is reasonable to assume, the credit card com
panies were low cost producers of advertising services up to the quantity
they supplied, then, on the face of it, an allocational inefficiency
would result.
The author would be the last to suggest that the supply of informa
tion about goods that is produced in this fashion is the same as would be
produced in the construct of perfect competition in which information is
costless to obtain. There are a number of obvious problems with the
present system. Cardholders, having learned of a product from a credit
card company, may pay with another instrument (i.e., a check or different
credit card). Non-cardholders may discover a firm or product because of
an advertisement by a credit card company, and purchase the product or
18
patronize the firm without using the credit card in question. In the
first case, a f:.rm makes a sale as the result of information supplied by
the credit card company, but does not pay for the cost of producing the
information. Other things equal, this kind of situation would increase
as retailers make cash discounts. In the second case, the effects are
similar, though the settlement has no immediate impact on this class of
freeriders.
If the credit card companies cannot prevent retailers from granting
cash discounts, then a remarkably ingenious method for the private
18
Significantly, the credit card companies make no apparent attempt
to obtain subscribers to their magazines among non-cardholders.
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production of a public good will have been thwarted. The adoption of the
marketing technique in question would seem to have resulted in a greater
supply of advertising than would otherwise be the case. Forbidding it
may very well result in an undersupply of information.
It is, of course, true that some of the advertising of retailers by
credit card companies is simply a method of stimulating the use of the
credit card in general. That this type of general advertising occurs is
in no way inconsistent with the hypothesis of this paper. Again, what is
being argued is that the fee (a percentage of the sales) paid by retailers
to the credit card companies is substantially for advertising services.
Part of the demand by credit card-paying customers for the products of a
particular firm may be the result of this general advertising. Another
part of the demand for the firm's products is due to the firm-specific
advertising, which this paper has focused on. There is no way for the
firm to separate out the source of credit card customers' demand between
general and specific advertising. Nor would there be any reason for the
firm to do so. The results are the same, and the general advertising
being equally a public good, the costs of producing it must be appor
tioned among the users of the good according to their relative intensity
of demand for that good.
The Fee Scale
The hypothesis offered suggests that the fee charged by American
Express is in large part intended to compensate for advertising services
supplied retailers. The size of the fee paid by a retailer should then
be proportional to the benefits received from this advertising. The size
of the sales paid for with the American Express card (or any other credit
card) is taken as an approximate measure of those benefits. Therefore,
- 14 -
one would expect that the size of the fee paid to American Express would
be directly proportional to the sales on American Express cards. The
fee is a proportion of sales. Yet there is a provision of the contract
between American Express and its retailers, which, if it does not call
into question the aforementioned implication, does seem to raise anew
the question of whether American Express should be treated as having
monopoly power. This provision allows for a sliding scale on the fees
charged as a percent of sales, depending on the annual volume of charges;
front 67o (0 to $10,000) to 4 1/2% ($500,000 and over). On the face of it,
it does seem as if American Express might be engaging in price discrimin
ation among buyers with different elasticities of demand for its adver
tising services. But there is an equally plausible interpretation that
does not rely on the implausible assumption (for the reasons already
adduced) that American Express possesses any monopoly power. I would
suggest that American Express faces a different demand price from firms
of different size for its advertising services. And that these different
demand prices are a function of the greater availability of substitutes
for American Express advertising facing firms of larger size (and, hence,
of potentially larger sales on the American Express card).^^
Recall that the advertising function of American Express has been
taken to be most important for the cardholder possessing comparatively
little information about the establishments in a given local (e.g., for
19It is as though American Express were a pure competitor in different
markets. This, as opposed to their being in one market and separating out
various buyers in that one market according to their elasticity of demand.
This may seem a fine point, but in the absence of other evidence of
American Express or the other credit card companies possessing monopoly
power, an explanation in terms of classic price discrimination would seem
to be ruled out.
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the business traveler in a strange city). The larger a hotel, restaurant,
etc. catering to business travelers is, the more likely it is that it can
profitably take advantage of national advertising media on its own (where
this option would be all but closed to a smaller firm that nonetheless
depends' on business—and tourist--traffic). And the more likely it is that
American Express cardholder already would know something of the larger
establishment. American Express would be responsible for supplying less
of the total information about the establishment that is possessed by a
cardholder. It Is true that American Express is more likely to run a
full page advertisement in Time magazine praising the facilities of the
New York Hilton. : But Hilton Hotels* demand price schedule for additional
advertising by American Express or anyone else would be expected to be
lower because it has low cost alternatives, than would be the case if it
could not take advantage of such alternatives. Thus the sliding fee
20schedule is explained without reference to monopoly.
A seemingly unimportant clause in the agreement between American
Express and its retailers is of interest here as well:
If your volume of charges in a full calendar year is
under $1,000 (or $500 if open six months or less during the
year) and you wish to continue your participation in our
Money Card Service, an annual American Express endorsement
fee of $25 (to offset partially the cost of administration,
advertising and promotion) will be payable at the end of such
full calendar year.
This clause in fact lends indirect support to the thesis of this
paper: that a significant portion of the payment by retailers
20^,
There may very well also be differences in costs Involved in serv
ing establishments of different size. A fixed cost of dealing with an
establishment would produce this effect. Even if this were the sole
reason for the sliding scale, the main thesis of this paper would stand
unrefuted. On the influence of costs, see the discussion in the text
following this paragraph.
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to American Express is for advertising. One presutnes that $60 (67« of
$1000) does not cover the minimum level of advertising (plus administra
tion costs) provided by American Express per year to its retailers. This
would be the case if the mere listing of the establishment by American
Express, plus the other setup costs amounted to at least $85 per year.
Alternative Mechanisms for Collection
Thus far it has been assumed that American Express and other credit
card companies would find no new mechanism whereby they could profitably
continue to provide advertising services at close to the current level,
in the absence of the restrictive clause in their contracts with retailers.
Realistically, one would expect the market to seek out alternative methods
of continuing the current, hypothesized arrangement between credit card
companies and retailers.
Currently the luxury cards charge the cardholder an annual fee, and an
annual fee has been discussed for Bankamericard and Master Charge. This an
nual fee is at a flat rate. It might seem that one method that American Express
could employ to collect for advertising information supplied would be to
institute a percentage fee for its cards, to be paid by the cardholder,
and to be geared to the level of his charges. While this method might
seem to produce the same results as does the present method, it would not
in fact. At present the compensation received by American Express from
each retailer bears at least some proportion to the advertising services
provided for that retailer. This would no longer be true if the charges
were levied against the cardholder directly. For the charge in this
latter case would be geared not to the level of advertising services pro
vided various firms, but to the intensity of the individual cardholder's
use of his card, which usage may be at firms for which relatively little
- 17 -
advertising is provided. In any case, there would seem to be no clear
relationship between the advertising services provided individual firms,
and the degree of the individual cardholders usage of their credit cards.
The credit card canpanies would have to charge a different percentage fee
depending on where the charge was made.
This method of billing would probably be a computational nightmare
for the credit card companies, though it has been suggested to me that
it is essentially the billing method followed by telephone companies.
That is, the rate varies depending on where one purchases the services
(in state, out of state, etc.). Of course, the number of possible
establishn^nts at which the American Express card could be used far
exceeds, for instance, the number of long distance calling "zones" in the
continental U.S. (there being but four such zones). Even if this alter
native method of billing could be instituted, it would presumably be nwre
costly than the current billing methods, which are universal and thus
presumably present some cost advantage. How far the assumed cost disad
vantage of the new system would affect allocation would depend on its
magnitude. The new, hypothesized billing method, wherein the customer is
assessed for each charge and at differential rates, would surely meet with
customer resistence. It would prove difficult to explain to a customer
why he must pay more for a charge at one establishment than at another.
It is true that the phone company does this very thing, but it presents
such a small problem to it precisely because it has an enforced monopoly.
Further, if the hypothetical fee structure were adopted, someone would
surely suggest price discrimination were being practiced. And, again, in
the absence of a legal monopoly such as is possessed by the telephone
companies, few companies would be likely to incur the sanctions of the
- 18 -
anti-trust laws to Institute a new billing mechanism.
More to the point, however, the existence of an explicit charge to
21the cardholder would provide an incentive to pay cash. The incentive
would be greater the greater the explicit charge. As the charges to the
cardholder would vary, ex hvpothesi. with the advertising services pro
vided by the credit card company to the retailer, the incentive to "cheat"
(i.e., to negotiate a cash sale) would be greatest where the credit card
company's costs in generating the aforementioned sale had been greatest.
All things considered, then, this would appear to be a most unsatisfactory
alternative to the current billing mechanism.
In general this is not a paper in marketing, and hence is not
intended to suggest how ^n fact American Express will adjust, but only
that costly adjustmeit may be called for. Some cheating will undoubtedly
occur (the author ha.J heard of cases already). This cheating will have
a deleterious effect on the private provision of the public good in
question. Any known alternative method of organizing payment for adver
tising services will not be cheaper, or it would already have been adopted.
It could very well be considerably niore expensive.
To sum up, then, ^ best the suit would seem to be pointless, because
it will not in the end have accomplished what it set out to. This would be
the case if a relatively cheap substitute method of collection is found,
or if retailers quickly perceive the costs of cheating (i.e., that they
must then provide more of their own, presumably higher cost advertising
21Note that if the chief motivation for a customer's using a credit
card (and a retailer s accepting it)'were a cost savings, this explicit charge
need not represent an impediment to the use of a credit card, if the charge
reflected the convenience and cost saving (over paying cash or using a check)
involved in the card's use.
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services). Or, the iult may yet prove to have done a great deal of harm,
if an unstable situation develops between the credit card companies and
retailers, and persists over time. To the extent that charges come to be
geared less to the alvertising services provided, any existing inefficien
cies would be intens fled. A social loss would then have resulted.
On Credit Cards. Luxury and Otherwise
There is good reason to divide national credit cards into two distinct
groups: American Express, Diners Club and Carte Blanche on the one hand,
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and Bankamericard and Master Charge on the other hand. The first three
credit card companies do nrare of the kind of firm and product specific
advertising that I have described. The hypothesis perhaps best fits the
case of these credit cards. Bankamericard and Master Charge have no
cardholder magazine. They do not advertise the benefits of using their
respective credit cards to the extent that, say American Express does.
They do some advertising of individual firms that accept their credit
cards, but again not as much. All companies do some general advertising
23
to encourage the use of their credit cards.
^ And the charges vary as the theory would predict. Retailers have
^ informed me that if they pay 3 or 4 percent fee to Bankamericard and
Master Charge, they must pay 5 or 6 percent to American Express, In the
absence of the kind of hypothesis such as is offered here, it would be
22
Presumably, if one wished to include other national credit cards,
such as those of the various oil companies, one would include these in the
second group.
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Another factor relevant here is whether the "lesser" credit card
companies exclude retailers to the extent the "luxury" credit card com
panies have been assumed to do. That is, is the brand name of Master
Charge as important as that of American Express? It would appear that it
is not, but this is more of a guess than a reasoned conclusion.
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difficult to explain this behavior as rational, unless one were to main
tain that American Express has a monopoly over the means of payment.
But the argument of this paper suggests that proportionally more adver
tising and other services are provided by the luxury credit card companies,
and their fees are consequently higher.
Implications
It has been argued that credit card companies provide advertising
and "brand name" services, which generally reduce search and information
costs for customer and retailer alike, l/hereas other hypotheses for the
use of credit cards focus almost solely <'n the iiKDtivation of the customer
in using a credit card, this paper has suggested that one must also
explain the motivation of the retailer In accepting credit cards. More
over, it has been argued that there are benefits in the use of credit
cards that do not result from the use of certain instruments (e.g.,
travelers checks) that also provide services that admittedly are provided
by credit cards. Attention has been focused on the services broadly
labelled "advertising", because they have been generally neglected.
The legal settlement in question has only occurred comparatively
recently. The effects, if any, would not be expected to be particularly
visible yet, as adjustment to a change takes time. One implication of this
paper is that the widespread granting cash discounts will not be a long-
run response by retailers. Surely the future will provide opportunities
for observing the changes wrought by this settlement.
Above all else economics teaches the interdependence of economic
action, and the fact that a change in one part of the economy has perva
sive effects, not apparent to the untrained (which here includes lawyers
and jurists). It is not that economists can see all the effects, but
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their theory enables them to perceive possibilities that would not be
thought of by those untrained in economics. Indeed, one might say that
economics teaches one to examine the unseen consequences of an action.
Economics also teaches one to examine in detail allegations such as the
one being examined here, viz, that American Express has been engaging in
behavior that is economically (as opposed to legally) that of a monopo-
i
^ list. The analysis presented here casts doubt on this particular allega
tion. The most general conclusion that could be drawn is that our
monopoly laws may permit the suppression of competitive behavior. This
conclusion would not, of course, stand in contradiction to any claim that
other monopolistic practices are being pormitted or facilitated by
existing laws on monopoly and monopolization. But that is a subject for
a different paper.
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